

Comment

Fictions and elephants in the rondawel: a response to a brief chapter in South Africa's National Development Plan

John Sender

js9@soas.ac.uk

Abstract

How have South Africa's economic planners managed to ignore, or at least to minimise the relevance of the most salient facts about the economic performance of the agricultural sector, as well as the real experience of, and prospects for, millions of desperately deprived women and men living in rural areas? There are, of course, many possible strategies to promote polite fictions and buttress conspiracies of silence. The first section of this paper focuses on two particular techniques used 'to write a new story' in the National Development Plan's brief chapter on rural development (NPC 2011: Chapter 6).¹

The second section outlines the failure of the post-apartheid state to take advantage of the potential contribution of the agricultural sector, especially to expand exports. The aim of this section is to highlight some extremely adverse investment and production trends – the elephants in the rondawel – so easily ignored when wearing the NDP's ideological blinkers.

Getting better? How to write a new story

Technique one: manipulate and omit data

The NDP chapter, entitled 'An integrated and inclusive rural economy', begins with the claim that in the period since 1994 some progress has been made in reducing poverty and improving the welfare of rural households. This claim is supported by just one dramatic sentence – no poverty data are presented or analysed:

The National Income Dynamics Study revealed that the rural share of poverty fell from 70 percent in 1993 to 50 percent in 2008 (2011:195).

This is another way of saying that there has been some urbanisation in South Africa over the past 17 years, but it tells us nothing about progress in reducing the absolute number and proportion of rural people who are poor. Exactly the same data source cited by the NDP, the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS), does, in fact, provide clear evidence on trends in rural poverty incidence, but these data are not cited, presumably because they tell a story that is incompatible with the NDP's progress narrative. Between 1993 and 2008 the proportion of the rural population living in households with a per capita expenditure of less than R515 per month did not change at all; 77 per cent of rural people, and probably an even larger percentage of rural Africans, fell below this particular poverty line in *both* these years (Leibbrandt et al 2010:38, Table 2.12). Since the rural population of South Africa increased by about a million over this period, the absolute number of poor rural South Africans has certainly increased.²

The NDP is correct in claiming that social grants have made a substantial contribution to the income of rural households. Without these grants there would have been an even larger increase in the number of rural people struggling to survive below the poverty line (Meth 2011:42).³ There is no basis at all, however, for the claim that farm workers now 'receive better wages' than they did in 1993. The NDP does not, and indeed cannot, produce any statistics to justify this astonishing claim.⁴

What the data do show is that labour has been casualised on South African farms—particularly between 1996 and 2002—the casual share of total farm labour increased from about one third to almost one half by 2007 (Roberts 2009:45). Despite widespread recognition of the abysmally low earnings of casual/seasonal farm workers (Ranchod 2009:9), the majority of whom are women, no effort has been made by the statistical authorities to monitor their real hourly or annual wages on a consistent basis. Instead, aggregate data are published on *average* nominal farm wages, lumping the wages of managers, foremen and permanent workers together with those of casual/seasonal workers. These data, collected using out-dated and sloppy methods, conceal very wide variations in levels of remuneration across different types of farm and types of worker, obfuscating the characteristics and trends suffered by poor rural households.⁵

In contrast, a careful and relatively recent study of the wages of casual farm workers in the Eastern Cape found wage rates for casual workers of R4.26 per hour in 2008 (Roberts 2009:89)—well below the official minimum wage that itself had fallen in real terms in both 2007 and 2008 (ILO 2010:117).

Farmers have used casualisation, immigrant labour and, increasingly, labour brokers to evade labour legislation. Of course, rural contractors pay very much lower wages than direct employers (Clarke 2010, Van der Burg 2009). Evasion has been facilitated by the state's failure to employ or support a reasonable number of labour inspectors in rural South Africa (Devereux and Soloman 2010, Greenberg 2010:16, Human Rights Watch 2011).

If there is no basis for the NDP's assertion concerning a reduction in the number of rural people suffering from abysmally low levels of income/expenditure, or for their claim that the real wages received by the poorest farm workers have increased, are its authors justified in making the additional boast that rural 'access to basic services has increased' (2011:195)? There certainly has been an increase in the number of rural households benefitting from access to electricity and to safe water, but the NDP's chapter on rural development is silent on the most dramatic *outcome* trends measuring the basic welfare of women and children over the period since 1994.⁶ One of the most distressing welfare indicators is the Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR). South Africa has become a member of the very small group of countries where the MMR has failed to decline since 1990. By 2008, 90 countries showed declines in their maternal mortality ratios of 40 per cent or more, while another 57 countries reported at least some gains (United Nations 2011:29). In South Africa the official estimate is that there were approximately 150 deaths per 100,000 live births in 1998 and about 625 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2010 (UNDP 2010:67).

As with agricultural employment and wages, state indifference to the survival of rural women has been reflected in a failure to collect reliable statistics on maternal mortality: 'South Africa does not have reliable and consistent, locally-produced, national MMR estimates' (Blaauw and Penn-Kekana 2010:6).⁷ Government has neglected opportunities to collect more robust data, for example through its decision to cancel the planned Demographic and Health Survey in 2008, but the most careful assessment of all of the available modelling exercises concludes that, 'the likelihood is that the MMR has been steadily increasing rather than decreasing since 1990 ... a significant number of women, both HIV-negative and HIV-positive, still die of preventable direct obstetric causes each year' (Blaauw and Penn-Kekana 2010:19). The failure to prevent death from direct obstetric causes appears to be concentrated in rural areas, where there is a 'lack of blood for transfusion, inadequate emergency transport, poor referral systems, insufficient intensive care unit facilities, and lack of appropriately trained

staff to manage obstetric emergencies', especially in the Level 1 Hospitals (District) which are the only hospitals that most rural women are likely to enter (Odhiambo and Mthathi 2011:16).⁸ It is hardly surprising that rural women appear to be most dissatisfied with the 'progress' achieved in the recent past. In NIDS 2008, 'Among African adults in South Africa, rural women were the least likely to report that their subjective well-being had improved and the most likely to report being less happy now than 10 years ago' (Casale and Posel 2010a:50-51).

Turning to the basic welfare of children, the national trends in Under Five Mortality (U5MR) in South Africa are extremely disturbing, especially because the U5MR is generally regarded as an excellent indicator of the overall quality of care achieved by health systems and, more generally, of human welfare. These trends cannot be attributed entirely to the HIV-AIDS epidemic (Eley 2010:41). Much of the failure to reduce the relatively high U5MR in rural areas over the two decades since 1990 can be accounted for by the failure to reduce the high numbers of rural children suffering from low birth weight, diarrhoea, lower respiratory infections and malnutrition. A substantial proportion of rural children have still not been vaccinated and do not have access to basic sanitation or live in houses with safe water on site (Hall et al 2010:112, Hall and Marera 2010:130-1).⁹ In addition, there has been a strategic failure to introduce policies to reduce the very high rates of TB transmission affecting South Africa's children, rates that predate the HIV epidemic and have not declined over the last decade (Wood et al 2011:112). The recent pattern of health expenditure in South Africa certainly does not suggest that preventing the death of rural children has been a priority: about 60 per cent of health expenditure is devoted to the 15 per cent of South Africa's children using the private sector, and about two thirds of paediatricians work in the private sector. The result is that in the poorest rural areas and in the poorest provinces, where people are overwhelmingly dependent on public sector health facilities, there are hundreds of thousands of children per paediatrician as well as severe shortages of other health professionals, especially enrolled nurses (McIntyre 2010:8, Saloojee 2010:65).¹⁰

The outcome indicators for progress in the education of poor rural children are at least as bad as the health indicators discussed above: 'Rural South African children ... fare poorly relative to their peers in African countries: rural South African students came 13th in reading and 12th in mathematics out of the 15 African countries' (Van der Berg et al 2011:4). The

South African schools with the very worst outcomes, ie the lowest results in reading and literacy for Grade 5 students, are the historically black schools concentrated in the poor rural areas of the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu Natal, and Limpopo Provinces (Shepherd 2011:20).

Technique two: wave a populist flag

The NDP's unappealing vision is of an economy that will have reduced inequality by 2030 to reach a Gini coefficient of 0.5. The NDP does not emphasise that, two decades before 2030, over 120 other countries (including many economies at comparable levels of development to South Africa) have already achieved or well surpassed this modest goal. Instead, the Plan document is littered with exhortatory, populist, nationalist and patronising slogans, possibly in an effort to promote the illusion of cohesion and solidarity in an obscenely inegalitarian society.¹¹ It would take far too long to list all of the moralistic platitudes, but a few examples are sufficient to illustrate how the NDP attempts to paper over the deep cracks in the structure of South African society – to ignore the inequality elephant in the room:

People's views and voices need to be heard, their contributions valued; the poor majority need to be accorded the same dignity and respect as more fortunate members of society (p3);

A united and cohesive society is a critical condition for peace, security and prosperity. To that end, South Africans should: foster a feeling of belonging ... and responsible behaviour (p412);

Be aware of mutual responsibilities, engage on differences, seek consensus and expect compromise through social dialogue (p191);

South Africa would benefit from greater public awareness, mutual understanding and discussion of the future of its villages ... Unleashing citizens' popular imagination, creative thinking and energies are (sic) fundamental to tackling the formidable challenges and opportunities (p53);

There must be a change in mindset across all sectors of society – public, private and civil society – and increased focus on ... real change (p94)

Leadership and vision are needed from all sections of society, with leaders who are able to rally constituencies around long-term goals, recognising that the benefits may be unevenly distributed (p94);

We are Africans. We are an African country (p214);

We acknowledge that each and every one of us is intimately and inextricably of this earth with its beauty and life-giving sources (p179).

Populist ideology plays a particularly important role in the chapter on rural development. In this chapter it is assumed, in the face of all the available evidence, that the heroes of all populist stories, ie the 'small farmers', including the tiny number of Africans who have captured resources as a result of South Africa's land reforms, can and should make a major contribution to the growth of output, exports and wage employment in the agricultural sector. Poor rural South Africans would be well advised not to hold their breath while waiting for these fantasy wage-earning opportunities (Sender and Johnston 2004, Palmer and Sender 2006).

Of course, there is no reliable or up-to-date information on the number of 'small farmers', far less on the number of wagedworkers they currently employ.¹² So the NDP resorts to guesstimates based on wishful thinking and a poorly designed census conducted more than five years ago: 'There must be at least 25 000 small-scale farmers in the communal areas with access to more than five hectares of dry land ... If these each employ two workers, about 50 000 jobs will be created ... If about one in three beneficiaries of the redistribution programme farms on a small scale and employs at least two workers, 40 000 jobs are created' (NDP 2011:199).¹³ If wishes were horses ...

In a nod to the reality of diseconomies in the marketing and processing of smallholders' agricultural output, the NDP resorts to a mainstay of rural populist rhetoric – small farmer co-operatives: organisations that have served rural elites, as well as racist and neo-fascist agrarian movements so well in the history of South Africa, Germany and many other countries (Coetzee 2005, Peal 1989). The NDP calls for strategies 'to be developed for economic cooperation and association that give poor producers greater collective market power ... allow them to achieve minimum supply volumes required for participation and negotiate improved levels of market access' (2011:208-9). Unfortunately the recent history of the performance of smallholder cooperatives and 'associations' in South Africa, even when supported by apartheid and post-apartheid state institutions, agribusiness or NGOs, does not suggest that they will become capable of making a significant contribution to output or wage employment (Hellum and Derman 2010, Nganwa et al 2010, Mather 2008).¹⁴ The truth is that a very small number of large-scale farms will probably continue to produce the vast majority of South Africa's agricultural output. At present, about 2,500 farms produce more than half of total output, and all indices of the degree of concentration have been rising (Sandrey et al 2011:5).

An enabling environment for disinvestment

Over the past two decades, the most striking aspects of the macroeconomic performance of the South African economy have been the adverse trends in Total and Private Sector Gross Fixed Capital Formation, associated with the haemorrhaging of investment resources through capital flight – flight that was encouraged by government policy and welcomed by capitalists eager to minimise their already limited commitment to a national accumulation project (see Fine, this issue).¹⁵ Another important and adverse macroeconomic trend, especially since 2004, has been that the absolute value and rate of growth of merchandise imports has begun to exceed the value of merchandise exports. As a consequence, the external balance on goods and services remained negative over the period 2004 to 2005, in marked contrast to the positive balances achieved in the early 1990s (WDI 2011). Exchange rate overvaluation and the funding of current account deficits by volatile portfolio inflows are continuing to pose significant risks to macroeconomic growth (IMF 2011); these policies are not discussed here, but they are also linked to the facilitation of capital flight.

The role of government policy in stimulating adverse trends is also clearly evident at a more disaggregated level – in the investment and export performance of the agricultural sector. Of course, the NDP does not discuss the impact of any of these misguided policies in its chapter on rural development. South African agriculture lost virtually all state support during an ideologically driven process of domestic market deregulation and unilateral trade liberalisation that lasted for most of the 1990s (Sandrey et al 2008:89). The level of support to farms in South Africa, measured by the Producer Support Estimate, has declined substantially and is now at a very low level (3 per cent in 2008-2010), well below the OECD average of 20 per cent (OECD, 2011: 252). Unlike South Africa, most middle-income developing economies have adopted policies that *increased* their support for agriculture over the last decade (Aksoy and Ng 2010:2).

There is other evidence that the South African state failed, when compared to more dynamic competitor economies, to encourage investment to support employment generating agricultural production. South Africa has a poor record of investment in irrigation, which is a major determinant of labour-intensity per hectare in farming, and a disastrous record in financing agricultural Research and Development. For example, there appears to have been no growth at all in the total area equipped for irrigation over the last two decades and the ratio of the total area equipped for irrigation to the total

area cultivated remains below 10 per cent, compared to an Asian average of about 34 per cent (FAOSTAT 2011, and Svendsen et al 2009:19).¹⁶ Reserve Bank estimates confirm an overall decline in Gross Fixed Capital Formation in agriculture forestry and fishing, with real annual investment in 2010 below the level reached in 1984.¹⁷


Between 1993 and 2006 real agricultural R&D *decreased* by 0.83 per cent per year. By 2007, direct public investment in agricultural R&D was just 70 per cent of the corresponding level in 1971. The ratio of agricultural R&D expenditure to agricultural GDP has, for more than two decades, been much lower than the comparable ratio in Australia, for example, while there has been a dramatic absolute fall in the number of scientists employed as agricultural researchers in all the relevant South African institutions over the same period (Liebenberg et al 2011).¹⁸

In this policy environment, the area of arable land has declined marginally while the intensity of input use has fallen substantially. For example, fertiliser application per hectare of arable land fell by about 13 per cent between 2002 and 2008; and the number of tractors per hundred square metres of arable land has fallen by more than 50 per cent since 1994. Over the same periods, there were sustained increases in the average intensity of fertiliser and tractor use in the Middle Income economies (WDI 2011). In South Africa, the total number of medium- and large-scale farms and the amount of wage employment they generate have both fallen precipitously since the mid-1990s – about 200,000 jobs were lost between 2003 and 2010 alone. The number of these farms is now less than 40,000, reflecting the exit of large numbers of farmers and investors since the early 1990s (Liebenberg and Pardey 2010:385, Sandrey et al 2011:16).¹⁹

Yet the most telling indicators of the declining relative performance of South African agriculture are available in the (more reliable) trade data. In a context of growing world trade in agricultural commodities, the share of South Africa's agricultural exports in world exports of agricultural commodities averaged 0.53 per cent between 1986 and 1994, having been 0.85 per cent between 1976 and 1985. More recently, South Africa's share has fallen still further to an average of 0.50 between 2006 and 2008 (the most recent period for which data are available in FAOSTAT). In contrast, the shares in world agricultural exports of several major developing countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, China, Thailand, and Chile have all increased substantially between 1990/91 and 2006/7 (Aksoy and Ng 2010:12). Further evidence of South Africa's relative failure to take advantage

of agricultural export opportunities is available at a more disaggregated level. Since the early 1990s, South Africa has achieved much lower rates of growth in the volume of dynamic commodity exports (such as wine, apple juice and cut flowers) than the rates of growth in the volume of these exports in competitor developing and middle income economies. An extreme example is illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1



Source: FAOSTAT 2011

Of course, while the South African state was removing protection and failing to promote rural investment, agricultural imports increased very rapidly – from a nominal R3.4 billion in 1990-94 to R29.4 billion in 2006-8. The ratio of agricultural exports to agricultural imports obviously declined over the same period – from about 1.6 to 0.9 (Sandrey et al 2011:15), making a modest contribution to the worrying gap at the macroeconomic level between the value of merchandise imports and the value of merchandise exports noted above.

The NDP's strategy for the agricultural sector is not based on an analysis of the adverse trends in the agricultural sector presented in this paper, far less on an analysis of the contribution of policy to promoting disinvestment on productive farms. Instead, it waves a populist small-farm flag, without offering any reasons to support the claim that small farmers and 'new entrants', with support of dubious value from micro-credit, entrepreneurship training and the dysfunctional extension service, could make a significant contribution to the urgent need for growth in exports and wage employment.

However, the NDP does hedge its bets. It sensibly recommends 'picking winners' and some sort of support for existing large-scale farms producing exports such as citrus, table and dried grapes, avocados and vegetables. It also recognises that investment in irrigation has the potential to be the 'driving force' behind rural development (2011: 196), although it is hopelessly vague about where on its long list of unordered priorities irrigation should be placed. The document lacks quantitative information about the scale, timing, and methods of financing the rural infrastructural investments that the state should now undertake. Instead, it repeatedly genuflects toward the failed deity of public-private investment solutions, no doubt in the hope of maintaining the sound reputational value of the Trevor Manuel international brand.

Notes

1. The opening page of the NDP exhorts aspiring leaders of the ANC to 'write a new story'. Although the subsequent narrative is by no means gripping – no suspense or surprising twists in this treatment – the aspiration to tell a story and provide 'storylines' is a recurring theme of the document. Pitching the Trevor Manuel brand to the international financial community has been remarkably well-received in the past, but his treatments and storylines do not appear to have convinced the mass domestic rural audience (Casale and Posel 2010a:50-51).
2. FAOSTAT indicates that the rural population increased from 18.4 million in 2003 to 19.4 million in 2008. However, 'Statistics South Africa's mid-year

population estimates disclose frequent changes in estimated population growth rates, many of them unexplained. There is no coherent official population time series' (Meth 2011:42). Meth also argues that Trevor Manuel has for many years ignored or downplayed the relatively robust evidence that a total of about four million urban and rural South Africans joined the ranks of the poor between 1993 and 2008.

3. Although it is important to note that some of the most vulnerable South Africans, for example maternal orphans, have not benefited from key social grants (Woolard and Leibbrandt 2010: Figure 6).
4. There have been far too few published critiques of agricultural statistics and surveys in South Africa. One exception confirms the absence of relevant data: 'workers are supposed to have benefited from farm labour market reforms, but.... We simply do not know to what extent this has happened' (Conradie 2007). The aggregate data covering all sectors of formal employment, based on a re-jigging of all available household survey data, clearly shows a decline in the average real wages of both female workers and of unskilled and semi-skilled workers between 1995 and 2005 (Burger and Yu 2007:15-16). More up-to-date data from the same surveys shows a clear decline over the period 1995 to 2006 in the real hourly real wages of those African females who, like the vast majority of farm workers, are not members of trade unions (Casale and Posel 2010b:36).
5. There are huge differences between the officially recorded average monthly remuneration of African female wageworkers on farms and the wages of all other categories of farm workers (DAFF 2010:25-6).
6. Welfare outcomes for rural women are clearly relevant because, despite the lack of attention given to gender issues in the NDP's agricultural chapter, there is no doubt the females living in rural areas are far more likely to be poor than males or females living in urban areas (Casale and Posel 2010a).
7. There are also no reliable data on trends in the nutritional status of mothers and children since 1994 (Harrison 2009), although a recent study did conclude that: 'The nutritional status of South African children younger than nine years has not changed much over the past 15 years, as reflected by comparable rates reported by three national surveys' (Lesiapeto et al 2010).
8. Apart from these direct obstetric causes, HIV/AIDS has itself made a major contribution towards increasing MMRs. Any claim about improvements in the welfare of farm workers has to confront the fact women working for wages on South African farms have remained far more vulnerable to HIV infection than the population in the surrounding districts and provinces. The low levels of wages received by casual female workers have been associated with relatively high levels of transactional and forced sex, leading to astonishing HIV prevalence rates – as high as 50 per cent – for some recently surveyed female farm workers (Colvin 2010:60)

9. More than 90 per cent of rural African adults do not have access to a flush toilet (Casale and Posel 2010a:48).
10. It has been estimated that in six of the poorest Districts in South Africa the number of enrolled nurses available was 60 per cent of reasonable requirements (Daviauda and Copra 2008).
11. Trends in inequality in South Africa are only crudely captured by the Gini coefficient. A more telling account of trends in inequality concludes that: 'The share of income of the bottom decile rose from 0.27 per cent of the total in 1993 to 0.40 per cent in 2008. The share in each decile from 2 to 9 fell, while the share of the 10th decile rose from 53.9 per cent in 1993 to 58.1 per cent in 2008' (Meth 2011:50).
12. The actual or potential contribution of subsidised 'emergent' farmers to wage employment in South Africa 'has not really been explored' (Hall 2011:92).
13. It is reasonable to be sceptical about the wage employment that land reform beneficiaries will generate. 'Since 2006, through the proactive land acquisition strategy (PLAAS), government has taken to buying farms and leasing them out. In the process, it has spent just over R3.7 billion buying farms, but much of the land has not been allocated to anyone. Only 397 households were listed as beneficiaries by the middle of last year. This means that vast areas are standing unused, or that a handful of people are getting great windfalls' (PLAAS 2011:4). The NDP itself suggests that *reductions* in wage employment opportunities are a (more) likely outcome of land reform: 'Almost 10 000 hectares of citrus have been redistributed by the land reform programme, but 70 per cent of these orchards are in distress' (NDP 2011:201). Further evidence on the unproductive results of the land reform programme is discussed by Valente (2011).
14. The post-apartheid state has presided over the collapse of smallholder irrigation organisations previously supported by homeland bureaucracies and parastatals (Van Koppen et al 2009) and its efforts since 1996 to promote cooperatives for 'emerging' black farmers have been described as a dismal failure (Satgar 2011:8). The performance of cooperatives and other farmers' organisations elsewhere in Africa is also unimpressive, especially when judged by the benefits they have provided to the poorest rural people (Chirwa et al 2005, Poole and de Frece 2010).
15. Private Sector Gross Fixed Capital Formation has hovered well below 15 per cent of GDP for most of the years between 1995 and 2010, while Total Gross Fixed Capital Formation rarely exceeded 15 per cent of GDP before 2005, when a sudden surge to about 25 per cent of GDP in 2010 caused import growth at an unsustainable rate. Nevertheless, the share of Total Gross Fixed Capital Formation in South Africa's GDP currently remains way below the shares achieved over the same period by the East Asian and Pacific Economies and significantly below the shares achieved in all Middle Income Economies (WDI

September 2011).

16. Measured by the percentage of the area of arable and permanent crop land that is irrigated, South Africa (8%) falls way below the achievements of economies such as Chile (139%), Mexico (23%), or the Asian average (39%). See: <http://www.icid.org/database.html>
17. Foreign Direct Investment in agriculture has been a very small percentage of total FDI since 1994 and did not amount to a significant proportion of agricultural investment by 2005 (Tregurtha et al 2009:17).
18. The estimates of R&D output and expenditure in biotechnology are also low in South Africa compared to Asian, Latin American, Australian and other international comparators (Gastrow 2010).
19. The number of these farms that have continued to make productive investments is probably small given, as previously indicated, that only 2,500 farms currently are estimated to account for more than half of South Africa's agricultural output (Sandrey et al 2011:5).

References

- Aksoy, MA, and F Ng (2010) 'The evolution of agricultural trade flows', *Policy Research Working Paper Series* 5308, Washington DC: World Bank.
- Alston, J, B Babcock and P Pardey (eds) (2010) *The Shifting Patterns of Agricultural Production and Productivity Worldwide*. Iowa State University, Ames, IA.: Matric.
- Blaauw, D, and L Penn-Kekana (2010) *South African Health Review: maternal health*, Johannesburg: Centre for Health Policy, Faculty of Health Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand. http://www.hst.org.za/uploads/files/sahr10_1.pdf.
- Burger, R, and D Yu (2007) *Wage Trends in Post-Apartheid South Africa: constructing an earnings series from household survey data*. Development Policy Research Unit, University of Cape Town, September.
- Casale, D, and D Posel (2010a) 'Investigating the well-being of rural women in South Africa', *Agenda* 24(84).
- _____ (2010b) 'Unions and the gender wage gap in South Africa.' *Journal of African Economies* 20(1).
- Chirwa, E, A Dorward, J Kydd, N Poole, C Poulton, R Kachule, M Stockbridge and I Kumwenda (2005) 'Walking tightropes: supporting farmer organizations for market access', *Natural Resource Perspectives* 99. London: ODI.
- Clarke, JM (2010) 'FSC-certified plantations and local communities: challenges, activities, standards, and solutions case study: changing labour practices at Mondi Forests South Africa'. Unpublished report, Forest Stewardship Council.

- Coetzee, D (2005) 'Fires and feathers: acculturation, arson and the Jewish community in Oudtshoorn, South Africa, 1914–1948', *Jewish History* 19(2).
- Colvin, M (2010) Integrated Biological and Behavioural Surveillance Survey (IBBSS) in the Commercial Agricultural Sector in South Africa. IOM, November. http://www.maromi.co.za/recent_pubs.html.
- Conradie, B (2007) Surveying Commercial & Subsistence Agriculture. SALDRU, National Income Dynamics Study, Background Paper. http://www.nids.uct.ac.za/home/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=22.
- DAFF (2010) *Estimate of the Contribution of Agriculture Sector to Employment in the South African Economy*. Directorate: Economic Services Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. http://www.nda.agric.za/docs/Economic_analysis/macroE.html.
- Daviauda, E, and M Chopra (2008) 'How much is not enough? Human resources requirements for primary health care: a case study from South Africa', *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 86(1).
- Devereux, S, and C Solomon (2010) 'Overcoming inequality and structural poverty: is social protection a solution for South Africa's farmwomen?'. Conference in Johannesburg, September: PLAAS.
- Eley, B (2010) 'HIV, TB and child health', in M Kibel et al.
- FAOSTAT (2011) Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Online Database. <http://faostat.fao.org/site/348/default.aspx>
- Fold, N, and ML Larsen (eds) (2008) *Globalization and Restructuring of African Commodity Flows*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
- Gastrow, M (2010) 'Great expectations: the state of biotechnology research and development in South Africa', *African Journal of Biotechnology* 7(4).
- Greenberg, S (2010) Status Report on land and agricultural policy in South Africa, 2010. Cape Town: Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS), School of Government, University of the Western Cape.
- Hall, R (2011) 'Comment on the articles by Bernstein, Gcabashe and Mabin, and Bennett: revisiting unresolved questions: land, food and agriculture', *Transformation* 75.
- Hall, K, and D Marera (2010) 'Children's access to basic services', in M Kibel et al.
- Hall, K, N Nannan and MS King (2010) 'Child health: The general context' in M Kibel et al.
- Harrison, D (2009) 'An overview of health and health care in South Africa 1994–2010: priorities, progress and prospects for new gains', *A Discussion Document*

- Commissioned by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation to Help Inform the National Health Leaders' Retreat Muldersdrift, January 24 (26).*
- Hellum, A, and B Derman (2010) 'The making and unmaking of unequal property relations between men and women: shifting policy trajectories in South Africa's land restitution process', *Norwegian Journal of Human Rights* 28(2).
- International Labour Organization (2010) *Wage Policies in Times of Crisis*. Geneva: ILO.
- IMF (2011) 'South Africa 2011 Article IV Consultation', IMF. www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11258.pdf.
- Kibel, M, L Lake, S Pendlebury and C Smith (eds) *The South African Child Gauge 2009/2010*. Cape Town: Children's Institute, University of Cape Town.
- Lesiapeto, MS, CM Smuts, SM Hanekom, J Du Plessis and M Faber (2011) 'Risk factors of poor anthropometric status in children under five years of age living in rural districts of the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal provinces, South Africa', *South African Journal of Clinical Nutrition* 23(4).
- Leibbrandt, M, I Woolard, A Finn, J Argent (2010) 'Trends in South African Income Distribution and Poverty since the Fall of Apartheid'. OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 101, OECD Publishing. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kmm50t7p1ms-en>
- Liebenberg, F, and PG Pardey (2010) 'South African agricultural production and productivity patterns'. In J Alston, B Babcock and P Pardey (eds).
- Liebenberg, F, PG Pardey and M Kahn (2011) 'South African agricultural R&D investments: sources, structure, and trends, 1910–2007', *Agrekon* 50(2).
- Mather, C (2008) 'The structural and spatial implications of changes in the regulation of South Africa's citrus export chain', in Fold and Larsen (eds).
- McIntyre, D (2010) *Private Sector Involvement in Funding and Providing Health Services in South Africa: implications for equity and access to health care*. Regional network for equity in health in east and southern Africa (EQUINET).
- Meth, C (2011) 'How not to present poverty research results: the South African case'. *SALDRU Working Papers*.
- Nganwa, P, M Lyne and S Ferrer (2010) 'What will South Africa's new cooperatives act do for small producers? An analysis of three case studies in KwaZulu-Natal', *Agrekon* 49(1).
- NPC (2011) *National Development Plan*. Pretoria: National Planning Commission.
- Odhiambo, A, and S Mthathi (2011) 'Stop Making Excuses: Accountability for Maternal Health Care in South Africa'.

- OECD (2011) South Africa. In *Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2011*, by OECD. OECD Publishing, September 21.
- Palmer, K, and J Sender (2006) 'Prospects for on-farm self-employment and poverty reduction: an analysis of the South African Income and Expenditure Survey 2000', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 24(3).
- Peal, D (1989) 'The politics of populism: Germany and the American South in the 1890s', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31(2).
- PLAAS (2011) 'The politics of not making policy: the new Land Reform Green Paper'. Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) at the University of the Western Cape, November.
- Poole, N, and A de Frece (2010) 'A review of existing organisational forms of smallholder farmers: associations and their contractual relationships with other market participants in the East and Southern African ACP Region'. AAACP Paper Series – No. 11, FAO.
- Ranchod, V (2009) 'Labour market: analysis of the NIDS Wave 1 Dataset'. SALDRU, National Income Dynamics Study, Discussion Paper No. 12.
- Roberts, TJ (2009) 'Farm wages and working conditions in the Albany District, 1957 – 2008'. Master of Commerce, Department of Economics and Economic History, Commerce Faculty of Rhodes University.
- Saloojee, H (2010) 'Managing resources and building capacity in the context of child health', in M Kibel et al.
- Sandrey, R, C Punt, HG Jensen and N Vink (2011) 'Agricultural trade and employment in South Africa'. *OECD Trade Policy Working Papers* No. 130.
- Sandrey, R, M Karaan and N Vink (2008) 'Is there policy space to protect South African agriculture?', *South African Journal of Economics* 76(1).
- Satgar, V 2011, 'Challenging the globalised agro-food complex: farming cooperatives and the emerging solidarity economy alternative in South Africa', *The Journal of Labour and Society* 14(2).
- Sender, J, and D Johnston (2004) 'Searching for a weapon of mass production in rural Africa: unconvincing arguments for land reform', *Journal of Agrarian Change* 4(1-2).
- Shepherd, DL (2011) 'Constraints to school effectiveness: what prevents poor schools from delivering results?' *EconPapers*. Working Paper. No 05/2011 <http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/szawpaper/wpapers133.htm>
- Svensden, M, M Ewing and S Msangi (2009) *Measuring Irrigation Performance in Africa*. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). http://www.globalfoodsec.net/static/text/ifpri_measuringirrigation.pdf

- Tregurtha, N, N Vink and J Kirsten (2009) Presidency fifteen year review project.
- United Nations (2011) *The Millenium Development Goals Report*. New York: United Nations. <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Progress2011/11-31339> (E)MDG Report2011_Book LR.pdf.
- Valente, C (2011) 'Household returns to land transfers in South Africa: a Q-squared analysis', *The Journal of Development Studies* 47(2).
- Van der Burg, A (2009) *Going For Broke: a case study of labour brokerage on fruit farms in Grabouw Stellenbosch*, Centre for Rural Legal Studies.
- Van der Berg, S, C Burger, R Burger, M de Vos, G du Rand, M Gustafsson, E Moses, D Shepherd, N Spaul, S Taylor, H van Broekhuizen, D von Fintel (2011) 'Low quality education as a poverty trap'. Research Report. Stellenbosch: Social Policy Research Group in the Department of Economics at Stellenbosch University. <http://www.mg.co.za/uploads/2011/03/29/low-quality-educ-as-poverty-trap-report.pdf>
- Van Koppen, B, H Sally and M Aliber (2009) *Rural Redress and Agrarian Reform*. DBSA.
- Wood, R, SD Lawn, S Johnstone-Robertson and LG Bekker (2011) 'Tuberculosis control has failed in South Africa–time to reappraise strategy', *South African Medical Journal* 101(2).
- Woolard, ID, MV Leibbrandt and South Africa, Development Policy Research Unit, Cape Town (2010) *The Evolution and Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers in South Africa*. Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit.
- World Development Indicators (WDI)* (2011) The World Bank, September. <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators/>.