STATE REFORM POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA

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INTRODUCTION

A variety of contradictions and conflicts within capital and between the state and the popular classes coalesced in the late 1970s and early 1980s causing an economic and political crisis within South African society. It became clear to all and sundry that the narrow strictures of apartheid policy could no longer provide the social basis for political stability and sustain further accumulation. The social structure of accumulation that underlay the previous cycle of social and economic development brought forth more contradictions than it resolved. Hence a major restructuring by the state was required and a new social structure of accumulation had to emerge if the crisis that had been engendered was to be resolved.

In this regard a number of trajectories were always potentially available to South African society depending on the particular configurations of class forces that were thrown up. It is not, however, our intention to dwell on historically 'lost options', except to bear in mind that what held true for the past also holds for the present and future. There are always different possible means of resolving a crisis of the social structure of accumulation in any society, and different resolutions - which are always class resolutions - will produce different paths of social/economic development. There is no predetermined historical path that society has to follow.¹

Furthermore, the particular policies that the state articulates and follows to produce a certain resolution does not at the outset contain the pristine clarity it may achieve at the end of such a process. Confusion and ambiguity over the meaning of a particular policy, both as articulated and implemented, always reigns in such times. Consequently which aspects are emphasised to become central components and which become marginal are points of contestation between the various class forces of that society. Moreover, what seems to be total confusion and purposelessness is often also the reflection within the state of the different class forces struggling to imprint their own stamp, and hence reorientation, on the restructuring process.
Any particular policy propagated emerges from a particular historical context. Hence it is almost necessarily articulated in ideological language derived, partially or wholly, from the historical past it has emanated from. Organisations, of the dominant or the popular classes, attempting to influence, redirect, or take advantage of spaces created by a restructuring process are constrained by their own historical policies and strategies. They have thus to operate within a double limitation - that of the ideological language within which any position is couched, as well as the fact that past strategies and practices place objective structural limits, at least temporarily, on a radical reorientation of current strategies. This adds to the ideological confusion and ambiguity that necessarily accompanies state restructuring, and often results in seemingly unavoidable historical errors of strategic judgement by a variety of class forces and organisations.

REFORMING THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASIS OF APARTHEID

The previous social structure of accumulation was founded on a system of the differentiated reproduction and exploitation of labour power. On the one hand it was based on maintaining a migrant unskilled black labour force with subsistence roots in the reserves (or later bantustans), partially reproduced via a socio-economic/politico-ideological structure of pre-capitalist social relations. On the other hand the smaller, fully proletarianised black labour force was reproduced within tightly controlled urban townships. The state intervened radically via an intricate system of influx control measures to control the flow of African workers to the urban industrialised areas, whilst within these areas it ensured both the provision and tight control over the collective consumption requirements of this settled working class.

White, coloured and Asian workers were fully proletarianised and mainly located in the metropolitan areas. The reproduction of their labour power occurred differentially as well, although the differences were less marked than between them and their black counterparts. Influx control measures did not apply to them but differential access to state-provided collective consumption clearly existed. Essentially for white workers the reproduction of their labour power was secured through the operations of a social welfare state providing protection and subsidisation in the areas of education, health, housing, employment placement and unemployment benefits. Although differentially applied, some of these benefits of social welfarism were also available to the coloured and Asian working class.

The socio-economic form that this took was a racially defined territorial segregation. In the apartheid era of post-1948 this was summed up in the epigrams ‘grand apartheid’ and ‘petty apartheid’. ‘Grand apartheid’ captured the system of bantustan-based territorial segregation into which the migrant-based labour force was locked, while ‘petty apartheid’ covered the
The political form that corresponded with this social structure of accumulation was a racially exclusive form of democracy. Power remained structurally located within typical capitalist institutional structures - eg parliamentary forms, election of political parties, separation of executive from legislative - from which the black popular classes were legislatively excluded. It was a racially exclusive, and hence limited, bourgeois democratic state which manifested many of the characteristics of capitalist democracy for the whites whilst simultaneously displaying, since it was based on it, a system of state repression of many of the democratic rights of the black popular classes - eg freedom of movement, association etc.

This system prevailed successfully until the beginning of the 1970s when the beginnings of a structural crisis of capitalism manifested itself. Monopoly capitalism had come to dominate industrial capital with concomitantly more sophisticated requirements from the state-controlled system of reproducing labour power. Manufacturing industry increasingly displayed the need for the provision of skilled and semi-skilled black labour. Furthermore, as a result of the dissolution of precapitalist subsistence relations in the bantustans, the material basis of migrant labour was significantly undermined. Bantustans increasingly became repositories of fully-proletarianised surplus populations in the rural areas. Hence the state could no longer attempt to secure the social reproduction of this section of the working class by displacement of the social welfare costs of reproduction onto rurally-based precapitalist subsistence societies.

As a result of these structural tensions manifesting themselves within the social structure of accumulation, numerous pressures started to build up for a restructuring of the socio-economic basis of reproducing labour power of black workers. As Hindson (1987:82-3) points out:

Pressure on the state to reform the pass system increased substantially during the 1970's. Organised industry and commerce called for the relaxation of influx control to expand the settled urban population and the liberalisation of urban labour markets to increase mobility within the urban areas. Their concern was to raise labour productivity by encouraging settlement and improved housing, education and training for the urban workforce....Union organisation across the urban/migrant division challenged the basis of differentiated labour within the factory by exposing the full costs of proletarian migrant labour. With the decline of subsistence production, costs of living in the
rural areas had increased. Migrants often faced higher subsistence costs than their urban counterparts; housing had to be duplicated, transport was over greater distances and food and other commodities in the rural areas were more expensive. With pressure from unions, employers faced demands for higher wages to cover the full costs of reproduction of migrant labour. Migrant labour, once a source of cheap labour power, now imposed an added burden on profitability.

These structural tensions coalesced with conjunctural pressures mainly as a result of the struggles of 1976. Capital and the state were starkly confronted with the realisation that their policy towards the popular classes had resulted in an overt unification along colour lines rather than a political division along class lines. This was very quickly recognised as a serious and dangerous problem for the dominant classes and hence a new discourse of limited ‘reform’ began to be seriously articulated by 1979. The purpose of this new ‘reform policy’ being to ensure maximum division and differentiation of the popular classes: divide the black petty bourgeoisie from the working class by satisfying some of the former’s socio-economic aspirations; pacify the working class by granting trade union reform; divide the general black population by driving a wedge between ‘insiders’ (with access to urban residential rights) and ‘outsiders’ (with no urban residential rights).

This new ‘reform’ policy spearheaded by the Wiehahn (union) and Riekert (urbanisation) reforms was still primarily articulated within the politico-ideological strictures of apartheid policy. The state’s attempts to divide trade union rights for black workers according to ‘insider/outsider’ criteria were, however, very quickly dropped. This was not the case for state reforms concerning urbanisation policy:

The (Riekert) commission recommendations were premised on territorial and political apartheid. The view that urban Africans should exercise their national political rights solely in the bantustans was not questioned. Residential and financial segregation would continue to apply... In place of restrictions over physical presence in an area, Riekert advocated the use of housing and employment related controls to regulate population movement and settlement. Large increased fines for illegal employment and residence were to be imposed. The burden of influx control was to be placed on employers and township dwellers... So the corollary of accepting permanence of urban Africans and liberalising urban labour markets was intensified influx control... Riekert wished to abandon directly repressive and racially discriminatory pass controls over urban Africans... A basic flaw was that rights and privileges
could not be extended to urban Africans and denied to rural workers without some administrative means of placing Africans in one group or the other. Hence the concept of 'insider' and 'outsider' (Hindson 1987:85).

Riekert's reforms in the sphere of reproduction and Wiehahn's on unions were not articulated on their own; they formed part of a market oriented, monetarist state reform policy articulated and gradually implemented from 1979, which included the de Kock commission's work on monetary and exchange rate policy and the Kleu commission on industrial development policy. Although monetarism has come in the narrow sense to mean the use of financial controls to stabilise the price level, our usage follows John Wells' (1981) interpretation of the term as meaning an attempt to 'achieve a major change in the balance of power... and a restructuring of the system of production', and, one can add, of reproduction, finance, etc, in favour of capital. The radical 'free market' variant is but one of many possible strands within a monetarist framework.

The perceived failure of 'non-market and semi-market oriented methods of monetary policy in the 1960s and the 1970s' (Nedbank Report, 1983:183-4) led to the view that fundamental reform of monetary and exchange rate policy was necessary. The change started with the publication of the first interim report of the de Kock commission at the end of 1978. The recommendations of the de Kock commission incorporated a commitment to more market related interest and exchange rates, stressed the need for 'conservative' monetary and fiscal policies, general financial discipline, for a more competitive spot foreign exchange market, and for forward exchange rates which better reflect US-SA short term interest rate differentials. It led to the abolition of deposit rate controls, and the ceiling on bank credit, the raising on several occasions of the maximum ceiling on lending rates imposed in terms of the Limitation and Disclosure of Finance Charges Act (No 76 of 1970) and the raising of the politically sensitive agriculture and mortgage bond rates.

Perhaps the most significant consequence of the de Kock commission's work, however, was the abolition of the exchange control on non-residents on 7 February 1983. These, and related reforms in financial policy, such as the SARB's encouragement of short-term foreign borrowing had the effect of opening up the SA economy to international developments in the belief that SA development could only benefit from such a policy of liberalisation.

The Kleu commission on industrial development strategy, complemented these ideas, stressing that an industrial strategy for SA 'must be determined within the framework of a system in which freedom of enterprise, consumer's
freedom of choice and private ownership play a fundamental part' (Kleu, 1983:1) The report also argued against the further encouragement of import replacement believing that those options were now limited, and urged switching to a more outward looking strategy. The commission was clearly opposed to greater trade protection in the form of import tariffs and quotas. This contrasts markedly with previous industrial strategy - eg the 1958 Viljoen commission, while recognising the importance of export promotion, had recommended a continuation of the policy of placing the main weight of trade and industrial policy on import replacement in order to stimulate local manufacturing industry. This was a policy which first became prominent in the 1920s and which had remained, more or less, intact ever since. Various commentators, including du Plessis (1965) and Scheepers (1969) as well as the Reynders commission (1972) had raised doubts about the continued usefulness of an inward looking strategy to SA development. The continuing crisis in the SA political economy since the early 1970s, however, appears to have lent extra weight to the recommendations of the Kleu commission.

This free market, monetarist responses was also dominated by the state’s attempt to reduce its expenditure. But while the state cut back on some areas of expenditure, mainly in subsidies on (black) consumption items, it increased, or was forced to increase, expenditure on others, such as defence, law and order, black education, industrial decentralisation, constitutional development, etc. In effect, the state was not so much removing itself from the political economy as changing its role.

In general this movement towards monetarist policies and the freeing up of markets in SA was buttressed by the international ascendancy of monetarism and of finance capital. The domination of international economic affairs by developments in the international capital markets from the late 1970s bear testimony to this. In SA, local finance capital appeared to have a lot to do with shaping the local monetarist initiative, including the removal of interest rate ceilings and foreign exchange controls.

The first phase of reform thus represented a kind of ‘selective Fordist’ response (ie. an attempt at incorporating a protected ‘insider’ urban black population), whilst compartmentalising the marginalised, unemployed, unemployable population in the bantustans. The basic idea that knitted it all together was for these economic and political policies to stimulate new demand, arising out of the increased wages for the ‘insiders’, at least part of which would be offset by increases in productivity.

The basic aim of this first phase of reform was to underpin, on a new basis, territorial segregation by legislatively strengthening the division between urban and rural Africans. The state attempted, from 1979 until 1983/4, to implement this with very little success however. There were three reasons for this: the unexpected impact of the world economy which thoroughly undermined the de Kock free-market strategy; structural changes in the
socio-economic pattern of industrial and labour reproduction; and major opposition from social forces in the townships.

This first phase tied the South African economy, and the reform policy, directly to the fortunes of the world economy. If the world economy had boomed, and the gold price remained high, then it might have worked. If the South African economy had grown substantially then it might have been able to proceed with this ‘selective Fordist’ response. However, the world economy’s slide into recession in the early 1980s and the sharp decline in the gold price from 1981 effectively scotched this possibility. Furthermore, the consequences of the reform of exchange rate and monetary policy, following the implementation of the de Kock proposals, proved disastrous. The abolition of exchange controls over non-residents, the dropping of the import surcharge and the general move towards the liberalisation of South Africa’s economic links allowed for the easy transmission of the worsening international economic situation into a South African economy rendered (temporarily) economically vulnerable. The burden of these adverse developments shifted disproportionately onto local manufacturing industry, particularly the working class. This resulted in large scale retrenchment, soaring inflation and the withdrawal of cushioning state subsidies on basic wage good items (eg bread, transport, sugar). It also led to a further fiscal restraint on black township infrastructural development and facilitated shifting the burden of township financing onto black local authorities.

The economic and administrative policies that had been adopted in this first reform phase (monetarism and extension of trade union rights), instead of facilitating a stabilisation of the ‘insider’ urban working class worked against each other. The extension of trade union rights, instead of acting to facilitate the regulated rise in market demand of the urban ‘insiders’, served as one of the major defensive mechanisms of the working class as the economic crisis bit deeper. On the political level, instead of allowing for the cooperative co-option of the ‘insider’ working class, as Wiehahn intended, they rather provided a vehicle of political protest; instead of facilitating the depoliticisation of industrial relations, they fostered the radical and overt politicisation of working class economic struggles.

What the Riekert strategy failed to perceive was that the material basis of territorial segregation had been fundamentally eroded by structural changes in the socio-economic terrain of the society. Riekert, as Hindson (1987) argues, still conceived of South Africa as being structured by the historic divisions between precapitalist and capitalist sectors. This reform strategy, therefore, assumed that the ‘insider/outsider’ divisions of his reform policy could be based on sealing off the bantustans from urban areas.
However, the bantustans were no longer simply subsistence repositories of surplus labour. They were integrated into the national economy through a massive system of commuter migration to the metropolitan areas. Furthermore, the urban areas were themselves being constantly reformed and reshaped by the massive proliferation of squatter settlements feeding into reconstituted metropolitan areas extending far beyond the legislative or traditional municipal boundaries. The classic patterns of labour supply and reproduction based on the simple migrant/settled rural/urban dichotomies were being superseded by the restructured urban regional economies around the industrialised metropolitan areas which encompassed traditional rural-bantustan, rural-white, urban-industrial and urban-black areas.

In addition to these structural tendencies cutting across Riekert’s reform agenda there were also important conjunctural struggles arising directly as a result of these reforms. The period witnessed major resistance from squatter communities mushrooming on the perimeters of metropolitan areas to the ‘insider/outsider’ strategy. Furthermore, many sections of capital had by the early 1980s abandoned their hopes in the Riekert reform initiatives and were calling for a more thoroughgoing reform of state policy towards the reproduction of labour power. This would entail the abolition of influx control measures, the acceptance of African urbanisation, expansion of the urban metropolitan reserve army of labour and hence decreasing the pressure from unionised workers for rising wage levels.

Ironically the state’s attempt to move away from massive state involvement in black urban townships to ensure the controlled provision of collective consumption requirements engendered further oppositional struggles from within the ‘insider’ group. Riekert’s reform agenda proposed depoliticising the area of collective consumption by removing central state intervention. Territorial segregation was to be maintained by placing the controls (and penalties) on households and employers. This was intended, hopefully, to protect ‘insider’ black workers from ‘outsider’ migrants intruding into the labour market, thereby winning over the former to this new form of territorial segregation.

Riekert’s shift away from direct central state intervention was designed to go hand in hand with the decentralisation of administrative control to local black township councils. Collective consumption requirements in the townships catered for previously by direct state involvement were to shift, and thereby be depoliticised, to these township councils. But this ‘privatisation’ of housing and other forms of township collective consumption required that these councils be able to take on the financing and regulation role that the central state had previously applied. This required a major expansion of the local revenue base, occasioning severe rises in rents, rates and township service charges. The net result was that the state facilitated a wave of serious resistance from ordinary township dwellers
to this process. The state’s reform initiative to depoliticise collective consumption in the townships produced its direct opposite - the massive politicisation of struggles over township collective consumption.

The result was that, by the early 1980s, a new reform initiative was building up as state planners took cognisance of the structural and conjunctural tendencies occurring in the society. There are three major catchphrases used to describe this second phase of reform - ‘deregulation’, ‘privatisation’, ‘orderly urbanisation’. The shift in urbanisation policy publicly crystallised in the publication of the Presidents Council report: *An Urbanisation Strategy for the Republic of South Africa* (1985). This new strategy abandoned the old underlying premises of territorial segregation and accepted the interdependent, and interconnected, nature of South Africa’s political economy. Its premises were that South Africa be administered via eight interlocking, functional regional units which included or cut across bantustan borders. The purpose of state planning was to form functional economic, social and political administrative units.

Its major conclusion was that urbanisation of the African population was not only a historical reality but that it was also desirable. Hence future reform measures should operate to maximise this process for stability rather than attempt to undermine it. Without going into detail on the report the important issues for understanding the state’s reform policy were that state policy towards influx control, housing, and employment required radical revision. It was no surprise that it, therefore, recommended the abolition of legislative influx control measures. In July 1986 the pass laws were abolished. Furthermore, informal employment and orderly squatting were also deemed to be acceptable. Instead, the mechanism it recommended for controlling urbanisation was the Illegal Squatting Act and state interventions concentrating on urban social engineering. The point was to encourage informal settlements for the poorest layers of the working class and thereby differentiate them from those layers of the working class which could afford ordinary, or upgraded, township housing. In this it differed radically from Riekert which attempted to protect urban workers from rural workers. Instead, this strategy essentially proposed making intra-urban divisions along the lines of ‘economic status’. Instead of protecting ‘insiders’ from ‘outsiders’ it proposes to use urbanisation to increase competition between workers, not only to hold wage levels down, but principally to act as a process of class differentiation. Those black workers (i.e. the unemployed or low-paid unskilled) who are unable to secure steady employment, secure housing and services are hence forced out of the more stable urban townships, whether they remain as they are or upgraded, into informal settlements within the
This second reform phase in its economic aspects is still dominated by monetarism, but it differs from the first phase in two important ways. Firstly, although the driving force is still finance capital, which dominates the monopoly capitalist sector of the South African economy, the policy favours this capital's industrial rather than financial side. This is manifested in the fact that the economic aspects are no longer tied to de Kock's free-market financial regulations but instead relate to concern and discussion around the regeneration of productive accumulation in the manufacturing sector.

Secondly, the emphasis has shifted away from financial strategies to those of privatisation and deregulation. These, as conceived and implemented within the state's reform process, seem to rest on two foundations. Firstly, the need to expand state revenue given the budgetary squeeze engendered by the current economic situation. Secondly, the need to initiate a massive downgrading of the social welfare functions of the state so that the incorporation of blacks into the same urbanised social sphere as whites does not present the state with requirements for massive expenditure in order to meet the new demands on state-provided collective consumption. This second phase of reform also represents a Fordist solution but at a lower level, with a more diffused, less defined black urban population, although exhibiting much sharper class differentiation within it, than that envisaged by the 'insider' policies of the first phase.

In summary then, the intention of this new second phase of the state's reform policy is to reorganise the class structure of black society by encouraging class differentiation on a new social and geographic basis. The reproduction of differentiated labour power is to take place wholly within the confines of capitalist society and through a state-directed process of urbanisation:

The newly implemented system of identification and residential controls seeks to install a more complex and finely graduated social division of labour in which racial groups are internally stratified along class lines and in which the division between the bantustans and white areas is gradually superseded by development and metropolitan regions. The aim of this evolving system is to expose urban labour to the competition of surplus labour from the bantustans, but to regulate and order this process within a regional planning framework which structures labour markets in terms of the principles of racial residential segregation and deconcentration (Hindson, 1987:99).
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ELEMENTS OF REFORM

As is obvious from the previous section the National Party initiated reform process, shifting state policy away from classic Verwoerdian apartheid, displayed all the characteristics of being locked into parameters set by its own historical starting point. This engendered a major ideological confusion as to what the process was about - a confusion which permeated both the dominant classes and the popular classes; both the state and the principal organisations of the masses. If, however, in retrospect, we unpack the reform process we can perceive that essentially it was composed of three discernible elements which were often jumbled up and presented as necessarily interconnected. They can however be conceptually separated, just as the state is currently separating them out in practice. These elements were:

- initiating a limited process of ‘democratisation’ of ideological and political life;
- implementing a dual process of ‘de-racialisation/re-racialisation’ of social and political life;
- instituting a partial, and selective, ‘redistribution’ of social resources towards the black majority.

The ‘democratisation’ of social and political life that the reform process engendered was limited, but nonetheless significant. This process did not entail anything like the complete liberalisation of political and ideological life, or the extension of the democratic rights of political election and representation to the disenfranchised majority. Nevertheless the movement to initiate a process of limited liberalisation of political life was real. At this stage of reform, it was seen, particularly by verligte Nationalists and liberal capital, as an integral and necessary necessary part of the shift away from Verwoerdian apartheid. Furthermore, the lessons of trade union struggles, and the example of the stabilisation of the industrial relations arena, was not lost on capital and often used as a comparable lesson to be applied outside of industrial relations. Finally, the process of opening up such space was significantly influenced by mass struggles themselves, thereby extending the liberalisation beyond the parameters that those in power had intended.

It did, therefore, particularly up until 1986, allow for significant relaxations in some very important spheres. Space was opened up for political organisations of the popular classes to emerge openly (eg UDF and NF), and for other organisations to take on additional or new political profiles (eg COSATU and NECC). Particularly in the case of the former, space was available to operate a series of high profile mobilisation campaigns around a variety of issues. Furthermore, the affiliates of the UDF were able
to organise and campaign around a series of socio-economic issues - eg the rent and schools boycotts. The ideological bonds of state control were also significantly relaxed. New publications, journals, magazines and newspapers covering alternative news, discussion and debate emerged. Generally speaking, slogans, speeches, writings and reading materials were available and bandied about publicly by organisations and individuals in a manner that would have been inconceivable a decade before.

The state simultaneously initiated a contradictory process of restructuring the racially hierarchical boundaries that so clearly constrained and characterised apartheid South Africa. Some aspects of social life, mostly revolving around racially discriminatory social amenities (petty apartheid) were clearly ‘de-racialised’. Black people were allowed non-discriminatory access to a variety of social interactions that were hitherto denied them - eg parks, cinemas, hotels, restaurants, pubs and beaches. Furthermore, such previously sacrosanct pillars of apartheid under Malan, Strydom, Verwoerd and Vorster as the Immorality and Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Acts were abolished. The abandonment of racially discriminatory legislation governing trade union activity significantly ‘deracialised’ this sphere of socio-economic existence creating major space which was filled by the rapid growth of the independent (primarily black) trade union movement. Furthermore, although it was complex and contradictory, the abandonment of influx control and the shift towards formal acceptance of Africans as permanent city dwellers via the controlled urbanisation policy was also a significant aspect of this process of ‘de-racialisation’ of social life.

This process of ‘de-racialisation’ at the level of social interaction cannot be dismissed as insignificant for it represented an abandonment of the more overt racially discriminatory manifestations of Verwoerdian apartheid. Yet it operated within certain definite limits, even if these limits were never clearly spelt out by the state. For the movement away from Verwoerdian apartheid did not occur by simply abandoning legislatively enforced racial categorisation - ie ‘de-racialisation’. It was intertwined with a racial restructuring of other aspects of South African society, albeit on different terms to that of Verwoerdian apartheid. State intervention initiated a process of ‘re-racialisation’ - the most obvious and significant being that of the introduction of the tricameral parliamentary system and the concepts of ‘own and general affairs’. Reform, therefore, contained a process of racial elimination as well as racial addition; of destructuring and of restructuring Verwoerdian apartheid; in short a process of ‘de-racialisation/re-racialisation’ of social and political life.

The third major element of ‘reform’ was a stress on ‘redistribution’ of social resources away from the straightforward monopoly that whites previously exercised. The state and capital became concerned with selectively upgrading social and economic life of selected blacks in selected
townships. For example, the electrification of Soweto became a priority. The urbanisation initiatives stressed the importance of providing differential housing for blacks. The state diverted large amounts of revenue towards black education. 'Black advancement' within corporate managerial structures became a major concern of capital and was closely associated with 'reform'.

The state reform process significantly did not mean that the repressive apparatus of the state was being disbanded. On the contrary, it took on an added importance in order to manage the process in a controlled manner - hence the importance of the concept of 'total strategy' underpinning PW Botha's reform initiative and the greatly enhanced role reserved for the military within this process.

Furthermore, as we have already stressed, these three elements of reform were not initially separable out to those in the state apparatuses pressing forward with the reform process, nor to capital, nor to the popular classes. They appeared as jumbled up and seemingly inseparable from each other. This is apparent when considering the responses of the liberal sections of capital and the popular classes.

On the one hand liberal capital, intent on supporting reform, could not distinguish between reform of apartheid and PW Botha's reform process. Everything contained within this process was regarded as a movement away from racial discrimination and deserving of unqualified support lest the right wing of the National Party regain its power base. The option posed by capital was that if one was anti-apartheid, this meant wholeheartedly supporting reform, which in turn required getting into bed with PW Botha. Hence Saunders' (Tongaat-Hulett's) unqualified support for the National Party 'reform' program as contained in the 1983 referendum over the 'tricameral constitution' and the clear desertion of large sections of capital from the PFP over their rejection stance in the referendum. It was unable to separate out the process of 're-racialisation' from that of 'de-racialisation'/ 'democratisation' and assumed that the former was necessarily and acceptably part of the latter since it was 'after all a step in the right direction'. Hence PW Botha's reform process was for a short time given ideological carte blanche.

On the other hand, from the side of the popular classes, the various representative political organisations present seemed likewise to be caught in a vice of analytic opacity, but for the opposite reasons and with opposite consequences to that of liberal capital. These organisations of the popular classes had newly acquired the ability publicly to articulate a position on reform. This arose out of the state being forced to accede to their right to do
so via the 'democratisation' elements of reform. Yet for them everything in
the state's reform process seemed to signify no change at all or be reducible
to an unambiguous 're-racialisation'. Hence one witnessed the somewhat
odd sight of legal opposition organisations unqualifiedly denouncing this
very same reform as mere window dressing. The contradictory irony of such
a position seemed wholly to escape the organisations of the popular classes.
Instead of attempting to separate out, at least for their own purposes, those
elements of reform, such as 'democratisation' and 'deracialisation', that were
integral to their own struggles and required defending, the popular
organisations lumped all these elements together and declared that the
whole process of reform was merely 'apartheid in drag'.

Responding to the militant spontaneous mood in the townships, the
organisations of the popular classes counterposed to the state's reform
process a strategy of 'ungovernability'. The slogan was particularly popular
in 1985/6 when to many it seemed that apartheid was about to crumble and
the transition to majority rule was perhaps more likely than ever before.
Indeed, for a short time even the liberal bourgeoisie seemed to be
considering hedging its bets and Anglo-American's Relly, following the
PFP's initiative, led a high-powered delegation of businessmen to meet the
ANC in Zambia and exchange 'views'. Certainly the plethora of
'post-apartheid' conferences being held internationally reinforced this
perception amongst large numbers of those sympathetic to the struggles of
the popular classes against apartheid.

Underlying this misplaced euphoria was an assumption that South
African society was experiencing a period of 'dual power'. Hence an
insurrectionist strategy seemed most appropriate. The slogans dominating
political strategy were those of 'ungovernability' and 'peoples' power'. For
example, in Alexandra township, which ranked as one of the most militant
but also organised centres of resistance, there was a discussion paper
circulating which 'portrayed organs of people's power as tools to move from
ungovernability to dual power'. People's power was defined as:
control over every aspect of our lives - at work; at school; where
we live; over the structures of local and national government;
over the army, police, courts and prisons; the media; the
church; financial institutions and the economy as whole (in

The fundamental problem with this position was that, on the basis of an
inadequate theory of the state, it mistook a period when the mass of the
population was embarking on the process of spontaneously gaining an angry
consciousness of their potential power, with a period when a disorganised
state and capitalist class, unable to rule, was confronted with nationally
consolidating real organs of alternative and countervailing popular power.
The former period existed but the latter most certainly did not. The period

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was simply not characterisable as being one of ‘dual power’. As Jochelson (1988) has similarly pointed out in the context of Alexandra township struggles:

Local government did appear to have collapsed and left a power vacuum. But this did not mean the political terrain was ready for dual power. The central state, with its centralised power structure, still had its military forces firmly behind it and was able to repress township resistance with brute force.

Having made this strategic error about the characteristics of the political period, it was perhaps erroneous to expect the popular organisations, within which those positing this strategy were certainly ideologically dominant, to respond to the state’s reform process in anything other than a totally dismissive manner. As if one was witnessing a Hegelian dialectical drama. PW Botha’s ‘total strategy’ engendered its own absolute irreconcilable opposite from the side of the popular classes.

There are numerous reasons, which we are unable to deal with in a detailed analysis here, as to why the strategic options articulated by these organisations seemed limited to an insurrectionist strategy. We have already mentioned the spontaneous anger of ordinary people in the townships who in many senses came into organisation on the basis of such spontaneity rather than being organised by virtue of a clearly articulated prior policy. Placing all the emphasis on a ‘dual power’ strategy, however, was not simply the result of subjective mistakes - ie the ‘spontaneous consciousness of the masses’ or ‘mistaken analysis of the period by the leadership’. It was, in a sense, inexorably grounded in the structural and ideological limitations imposed by past strategies and concrete practices.

The organisations of the popular classes, just as much as those of the bourgeoisie, were limited by their own historical patterns of viewing reality. Certain other options seemed at this stage unthinkable, outside the domain of possibility, because they threw up what seemed irresolvable contradictions. Given the dominance of the ANC, the pervasiveness of its world view within the mass movement, and the respect accorded to it, it is not surprising that this occurred. By the beginning of the 1980s the ANC had been distinctively shaped by the forces that contributed to its re-constitution as the major organisational force on the historical stage. ANC strategy had become an amalgam of its own historical traditions, the influence of a long-standing and fundamental commitment to armed struggle, and the insertion of vociferously propounded traditions of non-collaboration with apartheid institutions inherited from the flood of black consciousness activists entering its ranks post-1976.
It was, therefore, in retrospect, not surprising that other strategic options which took account of the need to use spaces created to strengthen long-term organisation (ie qualified participation, or locally negotiated agreements) were regarded by internal organisations and individuals as unacceptable strategic responses to the state’s reform process and in contradiction, whether that was actually the case or not, to the long history of struggle they were seeking to situate themselves in. Of course, in these situations such ‘grand historical traditions’, are indeed always subject to the reinterpretation of the present and not necessarily a reflection at all of the historical reality. The near absolute dominance of the strategy of ‘boycottism’ provides a highly apposite example. Notwithstanding the genuflection that ‘the boycott is a tactic not a principle’, in practice boycottism has the status of first political reflex because it has become inviolately reinterpreted into the historical traditions of the ANC. This is, however, very far from the historical truth, as most serious students of our political history well know, and reflects instead the integration of traditions and discourses from other political tendencies - viz black consciousness and, in the Western Cape, the NEUM.

Be that as it may, the effect of these structural limitations was that the popular organisations remained locked in an ideological prism; unable to see that there existed other options than the dual polarity of total rejection or total acceptance of PW Botha’s reform package. When the slogans of ‘peoples’ power’ and ‘ungovernability’ swept the popular organisations, this added to, rather than caused, their inability to break out of this strategic prism.

By late 1986, however, this misreading of the period by the popular classes already had its own tragic consequences. Having put forward, no matter how inchoately, an insurrectionist strategy based on ‘dual power’ the popular classes and their organisations found themselves in an impasse. In many, but not all areas, they were strong enough to challenge the local, delegated organs of state power, yet fundamentally unable to even begin to challenge and overthrow the central organs of state power. The state on the other hand may have been unable to successfully proceed with its policy of localised ‘cooptic domination’ but it was by no means shaking on its very foundations.

THE SHIFT TOWARDS THE EXECUTIVE

The state’s resolution of the contradiction in the end was startlingly simple, even if it was likely to be only a partial and temporary one. The state temporarily abandoned the ‘democratisation’ elements in its reform program and initiated a series of repressive interventions to restore stability, if not normality. Even though they have not been eradicated, the organisations of the popular classes have been severely disorganised by the successful imposition of the various states of emergency. Furthermore, this has heralded a fundamental restructuring, both within the state and between
capital and the state, of the future trajectory of the reform process, particularly with reference to the constitution of a new social structure of accumulation.

The declaration of the various states of emergency post-1986 and their successful implementation brutally clarified the previous confusion prevalent within the reform process. In doing so, this fundamentally shifted the balance of forces within the state towards the executive - in particular, the state president's office, the military and the department of law and order. The shift towards the executive had already been formally inscribed within the new constitution heralding the tricameral parliamentary system and an executive President. However, this process allowed the restructuring to take place outside of the gaze of the public view and further entrenched a secretive style of exercising state power.

The mechanism whereby this occurred was through the creation of a parallel system of state power - the National Security Management System - vesting enormous administrative power in the hands of the military and the police. The NSMS consists of a web of between 500-600 committees and sub-committees spanning the country, running parallel to and plugging into the government structure at every level - from the cabinet down to the smallest local authority. It forms a shadow bureaucracy running alongside the official government bureaucracy and answerable only to similar security bodies above it. It invests in the security services an important say in decision making at every level over social policy. It, therefore, represents in its most stark form the shift of power towards the executive and has been described as a 'silent coup' which 'prised power from elected bodies and entrusted it to a secret operation run by the security forces' (*Weekly Mail*, 3-10 Oct, 1987).

The NSMS is structured in the following way:

- State Security Council corresponding to the Cabinet which meets twice a week and makes recommendations on total strategy to the Cabinet.
- A Work Committee of the SSC, corresponding to the head of departments and cabinet committees, which coordinates the work of the heads of these.
- Interdepartmental Committees of the SSC bringing together government departments.
- Joint Management Centres (JMCs), coinciding with the country's economic development areas, and corresponding to the Executive Committees replacing the provincial councils, to coordinate local strategies to deal with actual or potential security problems.
- Sub-JMCs correspondingly roughly with the RSCs.
• Mini-JMCs corresponding with local authorities.

The shift towards the executive is reflected in the composition of these committees. The JMCs are composed exclusively of civil servants rather than elected representatives, with the chairmen being senior military or police officers. Although the JMCs have no formal executive power - they only make recommendations - in practice their structural location within this alternative, parallel state structure grants them enormous power to ensure that these recommendations are carried out. For if a department does not accept a line of action recommended by a JMC then the matter is referred up to the SSC or one of its working committees which takes the matter up at director-general or cabinet level. Consequently the NSMS has been invested with an extraordinary capacity to circumvent normal state departmental procedures by leap-frogging to the cabinet to ensure that its proposals are carried out.

The social engineering role that the National Security Management System plays is clear from two statements by senior officials within its ranks. First, the theoretical justification:

The philosophy upon which the organisation is based is that the Republic is confronted by a multi-dimensional threat... in the sense that the Republic’s enemies attack the constitutional, the economic, the social and the security bases in accordance with a coordinated plan or strategy. It is the conviction of the government that this threat can only be met and turned back by the application of strategies using, in the same way as the enemy, the four main elements: constitutional, economic, social and security (SSC secretary, *Weekly Mail*, 3-10 Oct, 1986).

Then, the scope of its concrete application:

The lack of a classroom is not a security matter, but a lack of proper facilities or sufficient facilities can become a security problem... Nobody can tell a department they must build a new school. But from the security point of view you can tell them that if you don’t there is going to be a problem. It is now your problem to build the school; if you don’t it will become my problem and the (security) system’s problem. And prevention is better than cure. So although a lot of things are not security problems, they can become security problems (Senior NSMS official, *Weekly Mail*, (3-10 Oct, 1986).

The NSMS is thus quite clearly a political initiative sidestepping whatever representative structures exist at all levels in the society in order to ensure a coordinated security and redistributive intervention. The role of the JMCs is to identify problems in a community and deploy expertise to upgrade township conditions in an effort to defuse the political consequences. It is deemed able to do this because of its structural location within the state
which allows the NSMS to by-pass normal representative structures. Its undemocratic nature is thus specifically designed to ensure speed and efficiency of operation. The most public example is the Alexandra intervention. The speed with which R90-million has been entrusted to the sub-JMC to identify the needs of that community and act on them is directly a function of the NSMS ability to cut through normal bureaucratic red tape.

The function of this system is thus a ‘singular acknowledgement that the conditions of our country - and the crises of our cities - are never to be solved or resolved, but merely to be managed’ (Tony Leon, Johannesburg PFP councillor, *Weekly Mail*, 30 Oct-5 Nov 1987).

The NSMS has been in existence since 1979. However, it is only in the past two years that it has come to play such a significant role within the state's social engineering framework. This is a striking indication of the structural shifts that have taken place within the state's process of reform. Firstly, it demonstrates a decisive shift in the emphasis away from democratisation/deracialisation towards that of redistribution. Furthermore, it indicates the alteration in the balance of power within the state, and how, within this newly defined process of reform, the state apparatus headed by Magnus Malan has come to dominate that headed by Chris Heunis.

Both the strategies associated with Heunis and Malan are attempts to have a measure of selective redistribution in order to avoid fundamental political change. They are simply different variants of an approach to political and economic development that can be characterised as the 'redistribution to avoid political change' or 'redistribution for political stability and legitimacy' school. Both, in this sense, are attempts to establish legitimacy in black townships through the state instituting a redistribution of social wealth. In this sense they are essentially similar.

One strand of thinking within this school is closely associated with the Department of Constitutional Development and its Minister Chris Heunis and another with the Defence Department and Malan. For both these strands, the underlying assumptions are that for a state to be legitimate, 'it must deliver goods and services to the people, good schooling, good health', and so on, and this should be done through the development of model townships, as in, for example, Alexandra.

The differences are not unimportant; for the mechanism that each is based on has fundamental ramifications for the constitution of the state structures. Heunis is attempting to do this through structures such as the Regional Services Councils and Malan, through the National Security Management System, including the State Security Council and the various layers of the Joint Management Centres. The one is trying to build black
middle class houses through the direct use of the Defence Force, while the other is attempting to do this via black town councils. Whether the state builds middle class houses with the defence force or with black town councils is quite an important difference.

The Heunis strategy is a complicated combination of bureaucratic and representative intervention in order to effect redistribution. In so doing he hopes to create legitimacy for the town councils or RSCs that are seen to be able to provide some of the material goods, if not to all the inhabitants of the township, at least to the selected middle class. For Heunis the key issue is to create a situation where the state is seen to be negotiating with the community via his contorted representative structures, not over political power, but over development. The role of redistributive interventions is to provide legitimacy for his particular form of representative structures. In this sense he is still operating within the semblance of the ‘democratisation’ elements of reform. However, because he has been fundamentally confined within the framework of de-racialisation/re-racialisation, he has been unable to effect a straightforward democratic process of representativity. He has therefore to set up such a complicated bureaucratic structure of representativity that he has been unable himself to operate effectively within it.

The NSMS strategy, associated with Malan, on the other hand, places much more emphasis on the primary role of redistributive interventions by the state- the ‘great virtue’ of the NSMS being that it can cut through the tangled bureaucratic web that is the very creation of the Heunis empire. It’s not that this strategy rejects the contorted re-racialised structures that Heunis has created. It is rather that Malan is sceptical that they can do what they identified as primary - ie, ‘build the houses’. As Michael Spicer, of Anglo-American, put it:

it is not that Malan doesn’t think that black town councils aren’t good ideas; its just that he understands that nothing will happen if you try to build houses that way.5

In this strategy the provision of the social services is the primary objective, not the process of negotiation. The provision of the social services will, it is deemed, result in the legitimacy required, as long as you control all other forces. Thus this strategy is a corporatist one. Malan, through the NSMS, is attempting to incorporate the black community and hence deliver political stability and legitimacy by incorporating the black community in a kind of joint venture - ‘army leads, community follows’. It attempts to incorporate certain sections of the community that are selected to be built up in a joint venture with the army, police and administration in order to sidestep the bureaucratic structures holding up the provision of social services.

In summary, the difference is one of establishing legitimacy via representative, albeit distorted, structures or establishing legitimacy by simply providing social services. In the struggle between Malan and Heunis
it is Malan who, with the State President’s support, holds the upper hand.

The Heunis strategy became trapped in its own distorted form of representative structures because it could never ensure that the job would get done. Malan’s NSMS cuts right through that problem by setting up an alternative and parallel set of structures based on a straight hierarchical chain of control. It gets the job done but in so doing, however, eliminates the elements of ‘democratisation’ previously present in the reform process. Furthermore, by sidestepping the normal bureaucratic structures it also effectively sidelines, at least temporarily, even the highly distorted representative structures so integral to the Heunis strategy.

The security network is also a major force on the powerful Committee for National Priorities (CNP), which is chaired by the State President and includes all the so-called planning Ministers. The only non-planning Minister on it is, in fact, Malan (invited by the State President). The committee excludes otherwise important Ministers such as FW de Klerk. According to a senior state official this is now the most important planning committee in the country and can be equated with the SSC, which can override the priorities decisions of the CNP only in the short term, to meet changed security conditions. Although started in 1983, it has only begun to wield influence in a big way in the last year. In a recent comment (Sunday Times, 07.02.88) Barend du Plessis refers to the CNP as being previously just a ‘post-box’, ie of little importance. But this has changed rather dramatically, as anyone who has read the recent economic reform announcements of the State President will have noticed.

The restructuring of the relations of power within the state and its ability to demonstrate most effectively that it is by no means unstable has led to a re-appraisal of capital’s relationship to the state. The more conservative sections of monopoly capital, responding to the success of the state’s stabilisation strategy and the corresponding inability of the organisations of the popular classes to demonstrate that they are a viable alternative, have gained political control over the corporate organisations of capital.

Thus, in a major secret manoeuvre in 1987, a powerful lobby within the FCI, the ‘Corporate Forum’ of 30-40 big companies, threatened to withdraw their special subscription funding (said to be of the order of R20,000 each) of the Federated Chamber of Industries (FCI), because they did not accept its recent high-profile political stance, especially that of its chief executive, John van Zyl, which brought it into direct and open ‘confrontation with the government.’ A few years ago the FCI and ASSOCOM created the Corporate Forum to finance and back these organisations. The subsidies that the Forum was paying were incrementally stepped up, until the members of
the Corporate Forum resolved to adopt the principle that 'he who pays the piper calls the tune'.

The state of emergency became the trigger mechanism. The majority of Forum members became unhappy at van Zyl's high-profile political stance and his lack of influence on the state. Although there were contradictions within the Forum, the majority feeling was that his approach and language, as in the FCI's Business Charter, was too strong and proving counterproductive. Fundamentally the position adopted by the FCI was not in line with its membership on the state of emergency. Many businessmen, particularly those in the commercial sector in ASSOCOM, wanted their shops opened to black consumers and the consumer boycott smashed. These developments resulted in the resignation of van Zyl as Executive Director and the replacement of John Wilson, the liberal Chairman of Shell (SA) and President of the FCI, by Hugo Snickers, the head of the most conservative regional affiliate of the FCI, the Northern Transvaal Chamber of Industries. In short, capital has shifted its ground to a less strident approach on political questions and instead is attempting to influence the state through what they term 'the quiet approach.' In business circles this is summed up by contrasting the publicly confrontationist approach that Chris Ball of First National Bank took with the cautious, conservative, behind the scenes style of Warren Clewlow, Barlow's Deputy Chairman. The latter is cited as a more appropriate example of the approach for capital to follow.6

The scene has thus been set for the major emphasis in the state's reform process to fall on the redistribution element. As it now stands there are powerful forces within both capital and the state arguing against necessarily equating reform with rapid democratisation. Attempting to significantly widen the base of political representativity will only lead to increasing and uncontrolled demands being placed for parts of the available resources that the state has to distribute. In simple terms, the argument goes that there is no point in allowing politics to cut up the cake unless it can be significantly enlarged. Democratisation and increased representativity is, therefore, being seen as potentially in contradiction to the newly dominant element of the reform process - ie redistribution. Furthermore, it is argued in some influential circles that the parliamentary form is an obstacle to the current path that reform is taking. Insofar as it obstructs the construction of a strong state which can decisively intervene to ensure restructuring of the economy, sustained growth and selective redistribution, democratic representation even for whites, coloureds and Indians is being regarded as expendable. 7 The shift of power towards the executive is thus further reinforced.

As a leading official of one of the business associations said:
if ever there was a time for a dictator...now a lot of people say PW is a dictator, but unfortunately he is a dictator within a democratic system, the parliamentary system. If he could have
done away with that then it would have been a lot better.\(^8\)

Furthermore there is an increasing tendency to draw the political lessons of the South East Asian newly industrialised countries (NICs). As a senior executive in Barlow Rand succinctly stated:

We have to follow the path of the East Asian NICs. I think we have come a long way in understanding that the really important issues are economic, and we have desperately better do something about the economy otherwise you will never solve your political problems... You can only grow and give slices as the thing grows, otherwise you get too many distortions...you destroy the capital base...Study the economies of Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong...What is the government form in these countries? It is a dictatorship or colonial form.\(^9\)

Thus, whilst there is substantial sympathy, within the confines of a strong state, in placing the emphasis in the reform process on redistribution, there is also a consistent position emerging that executive attempts to facilitate redistribution are futile unless the state also decisively intervenes to ensure restructuring of the economy and sustained economic growth. Further reform in these terms, therefore, depends on further economic growth. Securing economic growth is being seen as the key to further redistribution which in turn can lead to selected democratisation attempts. With the question of economic growth setting the pace for redistribution, and this in turn laying forth the possible agendas of political reform, the emphasis within capitalist and state circles has become concentrated on a discussion of the various long-term economic strategies possible.

CONCLUSION

The reform process has been characterised by the South African state demonstrating a surprising ability to engage in social, administrative and ideological experimentation. Notwithstanding the fact that this reform process has operated within limits and parameters which have clearly excluded the most obvious and acceptable reform - namely full blown non-racial democratisation - it would be the height of folly for the popular classes and their organisations to ignore the fact that, with the emphasis now on the redistributive elements of reform, those in power in South Africa are engaged in a serious attempt to restructure the social basis of this society, in the process bringing into being new social classes and producing a more highly differentiated class structure amongst the black population. This process, if it carries on, and there is no reason to assume that it will not in the immediate future, will significantly complicate the class structure of the
dominated classes. The state may well not succeed in gaining the consent of
the mass of the dominated people of this society but this process of social
engineering will also undoubtedly create new and serious problems in
constructing an alliance of the popular classes which is capable of
inaugurating a non-racial democratic future on terms other than that set by
the dominant classes. We cannot just assume that the state’s inability to
construct a new and broad class basis of consent necessarily means that the
current popular organisations will be able to take political advantage of such
a process either. The tasks set for these organisations in the coming decade
by this process of social engineering are more than just frustrating the state’s
ability to construct a new social basis of consent. That simply means that the
state and dominant classes are forced to rely more and more heavily on
coercion and executive rule. The popular organisations have in the last
analysis the double task of disrupting the attempts from above to construct
a social basis of consent and forming an organised alliance of opposition on
a social, political and economic terrain that is likely to be significantly
different from that projected by classic apartheid.

If a willingness to experiment, albeit on the most bizarre and contorted
lines, characterises the more technical echelons of the state apparatus, this
does not, unfortunately, seem to be matched by the political organisations of
the popular classes. The theory of the South African state and the analysis
of the reform process informing our organisational strategies and tactical
responses is dangerously underdeveloped. We are already paying the huge
costs, in human and organisational terms, of a mistaken slide into an
insurrectionist strategy. It is now even more incumbent on us to come to grips
with the analytic, political and strategic tasks set by the coming decade of
state-initiated social engineering if we are make the strategic gains necessary
to bring about the social and political freedom the majority of the South
African population yearns for.

NOTES
- This paper is based on research undertaken by us as part of the Labour
  and Economic Research Centre’s (LERC) national working group on
  the current economic crisis. Many of the ideas in it are the fruits of our
  joint discussion. Our thanks to all the participants particularly Stephen
  Gelb.

1. The concept of social structure of accumulation is derived from based on
the French regulation school. The two key concepts for the regulationists are
‘regime of accumulation’ and ‘mode of regulation’:

An accumulation regime is a particular combination of pro-
duction and consumption which can be reproduced over time
despite conflictual tendencies; and a mode of regulation refers
to an institutional ensemble and complex of norms which can
secure capitalist reproduction pro tempore despite the conflictual and antagonistic character of capitalist social relations.....

The discovery of effective modes of regulation is an outcome of social and political struggles which stabilise to form a hegemonic system - class alliances, based on consensus armoured by coercion, which shape the interests both of the ruling and dominated classes into conformity with the accumulation regime....

Regimes of accumulation are stable to the extent that they provide specific means of mobilising counter-tendencies to the generic and specific crisis tendencies of a given stage of capitalism. Likewise modes of regulation provide means of institutionalising class struggle and confining it within certain parameters compatible with continuing accumulation. (Jessop, 1988:150)

2. The following section draws very heavily from Hindson’s (1987) seminal work on influx control and state reform policy.
5. Interviews with selected businessmen and corporate organisations of capital undertaken by us in 1987.
6. Ibid.
7. Kaplan’s comments (1980:94), before the reform process seriously got under way, are still very appropriate:

The functioning of democracy in South Africa (which has significantly contributed to the cohesiveness of the ruling class) has been predicated upon the uniform exclusion of the Black dominated classes and their allies - parliament and the ‘majority’ vote (of whites - MM & VP) were indeed the arbiter of political power. If this ‘arena’ was now opened to any significant and genuine representation of the Black dominated classes, the ruling classes would not have parliament as their virtually exclusive domain. They would seek alternative mechanisms of representation and organisation within the state than that now offered by parliamentary representation.

Any measures of ‘democratic reform’, a significant widening of the franchise promoted by the ruling classes will therefore simultaneously seek to curtail the importance of parliament,

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limiting its field of operation and allowing for more direct forms of bourgeois representation in the state... Paradoxically, 'democratic reform' will probably be at the expense of democracy itself.

8. Interviews, op cit.
9. Ibid.

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